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Abstract—This work details a hardware-assisted ap-
proach for information flow tracking implemented on recon-
figurable chips. Current solutions are either time-consuming
or hardly portable (modifications of both sofware/hardware
layers). This work takes benefits from debug components
included in ARMv7 processors to retrieve details on in-
structions committed by the CPU. First results in terms of
silicon area and time overheads are also given.
Index Terms—Information Flow Tracking, DIFT, Hetero-
geneous SoC, ARM Coresight components
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, high-technology systems are highly threate-
ned by security issues. In the context of software security,
original solutions such as DIFT (Dynamic Information
Flow Tracking) have been proposed since the 2000s.
DIFT aims to ensure the application control flow by
adding metadata (also known as tags) to information
containers (e.g. registers, memory addresses). These tags
are checked at runtime. DIFT already demonstrated a de-
tection of a wide range of attacks such as SQL injections
and buffer overflow.
However, existing solutions are not widely used in mo-
dern SoCs due to hardware and software dependencies.
This work provides a clever DIFT implementation for
recent SoCs without compromising their security level.
This manuscript also describes the internal structure of a
new hardware DIFT coprocessor and its implementation
results.
Section II presents the most relevant related works.
Then, Section III describes the main objectives of this
work. Section IV presents the internal mechanisms and
implementation results. Finally, Section V gives some
conclusions and future perspectives.
II. RELATED WORKS
First and foremost, DIFT implementations were primarily
performed in software (without any hardware extensions)
as done by Newsome et al. [1]. However, time overheads
were too high (from 300% up to 3700%). In order to
decrease processing times, several hardware extensions
were proposed providing lower penalties at the expense
of flexibility ([2], [3], [4]).
Kannan et al. [5] suggested to separate tags computation
from the main application flow: a dedicated coprocessor
handles tags, allowing the CPU to run faster. Further-
more, it allows to run simultaneously multiple DIFT
checking rules. More recently, other solutions aimed to
add features and improve performances shown in [5].
For instance, Deng et al. [6], [7] proposed a solution to
implement DIFT and other similar runtime monitoring
techniques such as UMC (Uninitialized Memory Check)
or BC (Boundary Check).
Heo et al. [8] proposed a system-level approach to
implement DIFT and other related techniques. Infor-
mation required by the coprocessor for tags computa-
tion is added to the application source code through
binary instrumentation. This information is executed at
runtime: it sends data from the CPU to a FIFO queue
read by the coprocessor. This approach, even though
more realistic and generic, presents some drawbacks: 1)
information leakage at the interface between the CPU
and the coprocessor; 2) code injection attacks may not
be detected as the injected code is not instrumented;
3) added instructions through binary instrumentation are
architecture-dependent.
Table I is a qualitative comparison of some previous
works. [5], [6] implemented DIFT using a softcore pro-
cessor. In both cases, there are modifications of the CPU
itself in order to export information. In this work, the
main constraint is that the CPU is an ASIC: however, it
will be easier to implement on several SoC based on the
same architecture.
TABLE I: Brief comparison of previous works
Approaches Kannan [5] Deng [6] Heo [8]
Hardcore portability No No Yes
Time Overhead + ++ +
Surface Overhead + - -
Main CPU Softcore Softcore Softcore
III. OBJECTIVES
Due to inflexibility and time overheads, DIFT is hardly
adopted in modern SoCs. The main goal of this work is to
provide a flexible approach for hardware-assisted DIFT
based on a standard OS and a heterogeneous architecture
such as Xilinx Zynq or Altera DE1-SoC. This work
promotes DIFT by proposing a solution with several
features:
• Targeting unmodified processors. Previous works
used a softcore LEON3. Zynq devices contain an
ARM processor which cannot be modified.
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• Scalability. At first, this work focuses on single-
core CPUs. An extension to multicore architectures
is planned in the future.
• Efficiency and flexibility. It must be a low-area
and fast solution: the processor must not wait for
the coprocessor to complete DIFT tasks (at least, it
may halt for the shortest possible time).
• Secure tags computation. It is assumed that tags
and DIFT outputs must not be revealed to an un-
known authority.
IV. CURRENT STATUS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
The overall architecture used in this work is shown in
Figure 1. Information required by the coprocessor for
tags computation is partially recovered using existing
debug components available in ARM processors (also
known as Coresight components). Remaining informa-
tion is obtained through software analysis.
Fig. 1: Overview of the hardware-assisted DIFT archi-
tecture implemented on a Zynq device
A. Global approach
Fig. 2: Coresight Components on Zedboard [9]
Coresight components (Figure 2) can be used to debug
(or trace) in an efficient manner multicore processors.
A PTM (Program Trace Macrocell) is assigned to each
CPU core: PTMs generate traces (e.g. partial inputs for
DIFT computations). Traces only provide runtime infor-
mation on instructions modifying the program counter
(e.g. branches). Traces are transmitted through the funnel
and replicator and then pushed in trace sinks (ETB and
TPIU). ETB (Embedded Trace Buffer) is able to store
traces in an 4KB on-chip RAM while TPIU (Trace Port
Interface Unit) can send it to the programmable logic
through the EMIO (Extended Multiplexed I/O) pins.
On the PL side, traces are decoded by the PFT decoder
(Program Flow Trace, see Figure 1) and given in a format
readable by the DIFT coprocessor. Tag dependencies
block contains information obtained through software
analysis and rules to handle tags. DIFT coprocessor
reads traces given by the PFT decoder and finds which
information containers must be propagated. Then, it looks
for related tags in TRF (Tag Register File) or MR
(Memory tags): TRF contains tags of each CPU register
while MR contains tags for memory locations. The
granularity of tags is a user-defined parameter. Finally,
the DIFT coprocessor looks for security policy violations
and eventually raises an exception.
B. Results
1) Traces generation: The approach described in this
work is at least compatible with SoCs combining an
ARM Cortex-A9 processor with a FPGA: Xilinx Zed-
Board is the experiment platform in this work. All syn-
thesis were done in Vivado 2014.4. Xilinx Standalone OS
was first used to develop Coresight components drivers in
order to understand the features offered by such modules
and to verify trace contents.
Coresight drivers for standard Linux are currently being
studied and compiled in a Yocto recipe. Traces have been
successfully recovered in ETB; however, parasite traces
are generated due to context switches.
2) Implementation results: For MiBench programs,
the overhead introduced by Coresight components is
negligible. As tracing components are in hardware and
separated from CPU core, almost no overhead is ob-
served. However, the worst case scenario is not evaluated
yet and further testing with other benchmarks needs to be
done before pronouncing on the efficiency of Coresight
components.
Area results of TRF and PFT Decoder IPs are shown
in Table II. Percentages are shown relatively to a Micro-
blaze softcore with minimum area configuration (without
caches nor BRAMs).
TABLE II: IP size for Zedboard (Zynq Z7020)
IP Name Slice LUTs Slice Registers Slice
Microblaze 824 530 300
PFT Decoder 308 (37%) 222 (42%) 110(37%)
TRF 49 (6%) 64 (12%) 13 (4%)
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A first prototype is currently being developped to demon-
strate the feasibility of the approach proposed in this
work. Next steps are to build a full-featured system
including a secure DIFT coprocessor. Then, DIFT on
both Cortex-A9 cores will be implemented by duplicating
DIFT coprocessor and other IPs. Dynamic partial recon-
figuration will be studied to address energy consumption
issues. The proposed approach is not specific to ARM
hardcores and may well be adapted to Intel cores using
Intel Processor Trace components.
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